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Abstract
This paper is a rst look at the dynamic e¤ects of BBPD in a horizontally di¤erentiation
product market, where rms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness. When a rm
is able to recognize customers with di¤erent purchasing histories, it may send them targeted
advertisements with di¤erent prices. We show that in comparison to no discrimination, rms
reduce their advertising e¤orts, charge higher rst period prices and lower second period
prices. As a result of that in contrast to the prot and consumer welfare results obtained
under full informed consumers, we show that BBPD boosts industry prots at the expense
of consumer welfare.
JEL classication: D43, L40, M37
1 Introduction
In many markets rms need to invest in advertising to create awareness for products, prices and
special o¤ers. The informative view of advertising claims that the primary role of advertising is
to transmit information about (new) productsexistence and/or price to otherwise uninformed
consumers. When rms and consumers interact more than once, rms can gather informa-
tion about the reachof their advertising campaign and learn the identity of consumers that
come to know about their products. Firms can also collect information about the consumers
This research has been nanced by Portuguese public funds through FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a
Tecnologia) within the project PTDC/IIM-ECO/2280/2014. Any errors are our own responsability.
yCorresponding author contact: rbranca@eeg.uminho.pt
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past shopping behavior. When rms realise that some consumers do not buy from them cur-
rently, they can use this information to price di¤erently towards their own and their rivals
previous customers. This form of price discrimination, termed behavior-based price discrimina-
tion (henceforth BBPD) or price discrimination by purchase history or dynamic pricing, is now
widely observed in many markets. Such pricing strategies have been adopted by web retailers,
supermarkets, telecom companies, banks, restaurants and many others.
The literature on BBPD has addressed issues related to price o¤ers based on information
revealed by consumerspurchase history.1 However, with the exception of Esteves (2009a) and
De Nijs (2013)2 the literature has hitherto focused on the assumption that there is no role
for advertising and that consumers are fully informed (e.g. Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000)). Specically, Esteves (2009a) and De Nijs (2013) depart from this assumption by
investigating the competitive and welfare e¤ects of BBPD in an informative advertising model
under the homogeneous product assumption.
This paper extends Esteves (2009a) to a product di¤erentiation market. The main goal is
to evaluate the dynamic e¤ects of BBPD when two rms endogenously segment the market into
captive (partially informed) and selective (fully informed) customers by investing in informative
advertising. We investigate how the permission of price discrimination a¤ects: (i) the rms
pricing and advertising strategies and (ii) the level of prots and consumer welfare. We also
look at the implications of BBPD in markets with imperfectly informed consumers in comparison
to the case where consumers are fully informed- the Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) model.
The paper considers a two period model with two horizontally di¤erentiated rms competing
for ex-ante anonymous consumers with stable exogenous preferences across periods who can buy
from a rm only if they receive an advertising message from it. In the rst period rms have no
information to engage in price discrimination. Because prices can change faster than consumers
awareness, in the second period, the level of awareness is constant and rms can only change
prices. Advertising plays a dual role. On the one hand, it generates consumer heterogeneity in
awareness of the rms existence and prices. On the other hand, by collecting information about
1For a comprehensive survey on behavior-based price discrimination see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and
Esteves (2009b).
2De Nijs (2013) builds on Esteves (2009a) with one key modelling di¤erence. While Esteves (2009a) assumes
that rms make their advertising and rst-period price decisions simultaneously, De Nijs (2013) consider a se-
quential timing in period 1. BBPD is employed in period 2.
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the reachof their advertising, rms learn the identity of informed consumers who bought from
them in the past and send later advertising messages (henceforth ads) with di¤erent prices to
their own and to the rivals previous customers. Although in the recent past it was di¢ cult for
sellers to reconnect and communicate with lostcustomers and entice them back,3 nowadays
it is possible for advertising agencies (e.g. DoubleClick, Tacoda, ValueClick Media) to o¤er
their clients the possibility to identify those visitors that were in their websites but did not buy
the rst time and reconnect subsequently with those potential consumers in order to encourage
them to return and purchase. The New York Times (August, 29 and May, 16, 2010) reveals
that this marketing practice, called retargeting is becoming increasingly common especially in
online markets, such as retailing, travel, real estate and nancial services.4 Retargeting is based
on the following main idea. Once a potential customer is aware of a rms website (e.g. through
normal advertising channels) and visits it, a cookie is passed to the consumers browser that
records his behaviour on the site and identies him as either a nonpurchaser or a customer that
bought from the rm. Then, at a determined time, old customers and rivals consumers are
retargeted with messages specic to them.5
Within this theoretical framework, some novel results are obtained. In comparison to no-
discrimination, BBPD in our setting boosts industry prots and harm consumers. This nding
challenges the traditionalview that such pricing practices in oligopoly markets often intensify
competition and potentially benet consumers. We also highlight that the ability of rms
to engage in behavior-based price discrimination can have a signicant impact on the rms
advertising strategies. A relevant contribution of the paper is to highlight that in comparison
3There are, of course, situations that motivate the present analysis where sellers have a way to communicate
with current and potential consumers. There are for instance websites that ask consumers to register and their
email may be one of the requirements, allowing the subsequent interactions. In the catalog industry, where
rms rely on lists of names to advertise their products, it is also possible for sellers to identify di¤erent types of
consumers and send them special o¤ers.
4This marketing practice is also referred to as behavioral retargeting, remarketing or remessaging. For more
on retargeting see, for instance, www.retargeter.com.
5Consider the following retargeting example. A consumer goes to an online shoe retailer and leaves the site
without making a purchase. Then by utilizing a retargeting technology, the shoe retailer can catch the consumer
the next time (when hes visiting a news site, perhaps). By visiting a site, a consumer has let that site know he is
interested in the product and retargeting helps the advertiser entice the consumer to return and buy its product
(e.g. receive 10 percent o¤ if you buy today).
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to the no-discrimination case, the permission of BBPD leads rms to strategically reduce their
advertising choices in period 1 as a way to induce a softer pricing behavior in period 2.
Hence, for competition policy our analysis suggests that it is important to taking into account
di¤erent forms of market competition when evaluating the prot and welfare e¤ects of BBPD.
Related literature This paper is mainly related to two strands of the literature. It is
related to the literature on competition with informative advertising (e.g. Butters (1977), Gross-
man and Shapiro (1984) and Stahl (1994)) in which rather than assuming that the information
structure of consumers is exogenous, it is assumed that sellers can inuence the consumers
information by investing in advertising. Specically, it is assumed that a potential consumer
cannot be an actual buyer unless rms invest in advertising. While Butters (1977) and Stahl
(1994) look at competition in a homogeneous product market, Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
look at the rmsadvertising and price decisions in a product di¤erentiation market. This paper
is also related to the stream of research looking at the strategic e¤ects of advertising in sequential
games where rms rst invest in advertising and, then, compete in prices (e.g. Ireland (1993),
McAfee (1994) and Roy (2000)).6 The main di¤erence is that here we develop a model, where
rms compete simultaneously at advertising and prices in the initial period and, if permitted,
engage in BBPD in the next stage of the game.
The paper is also related to the literature on competitive BBPD where rms engage in
price discrimination based on information about the consumers past purchases. Like other
forms of price discrimination, BBPD can have antitrust and welfare implications. While in
the switching cost approach purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching
costs (e.g. Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003)), in the brand preference approach purchase history
discloses information about a consumers exogenous brand preference for a rm (e.g. Villas-
Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)). A common nding in this literature is that BBPD
tends to intensify competition and potentially benet consumers (Chen (2005)). Behavior-based
pricing tends to intensify competition and reduce prots in duopoly models where the market
exhibits best response asymmetry,7 when (i) all rms have the required information to engage
6An interesting contribution of Roy (2000) is to assume that rms can target consumers on the basis of their
address (i.e. their location on a Hotelling framework). For other important contributions on targeted pricing in
competitive settings see, for instance, Chen and Iyer (2002) and Iyer, et al (2005).
7Following Corts (1998), the market exhibits best response asymmetry when one rms strongmarket is the
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in price discrimination, (ii) consumer preferences are xed across periods and (iii) consumers
are fully informed (e.g. Chen (1997), Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor
(2003), Esteves (2010)).
Some authors have recently explored new avenues in the literature on BBPD. Chen and
Pearcy (2010), for instance, look at BBPD under the assumption of correlated preferences across
time. They show that if there is su¢ ciently strong dependence between preferences, BBPD
reduces industry prots and increases consumer surplus. In contrast, under weak dependence
they show that BBPD increases industry prots and reduces consumer surplus.8 This paper
enriches the literature on BBPD following the avenue of relaxing the assumption of perfectly
informed consumers.9 In so doing, we show that the use of BBPD in markets with informational
di¤erentiation among consumers (due to the rmsadvertising decisions) can act in favour of
industry prots at the expense of consumer welfare. A closely related paper is Esteves (2009a)
which considers behaviour-based price discrimination in a homogeneous product market when
initially the set of consumers who can buy the product is determined by advertising. Due to
the homogeneous product assumption, the price equilibrium is in mixed strategies and only
one of the two rms, namely the high priced rm in period 1, will have information to price
discriminate in period 2. In comparison to no discrimination, Esteves (2009a) shows that BBPD
might benet all competing rms when advertising costs are such that rms advertise less under
discrimination. By extending Esteves (2009a) to a product di¤erentiation setting, new results
are obtained. We will show that both rms will have the required information to engage in price
discrimination, and even in this case, in comparison to no discrimination, rms will reduce their
advertising e¤orts which translates into higher prots.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 analyses
the equilibrium advertising and pricing strategies when price discrimination is permitted. Section
others weakmarket. In BBPD models there is best-response asymmetry because each rm regards its previous
clientele as its strong market and the rivals previous customers as its weak market.
8Esteves and Reggiani (2014a) look at BBPD when demand is not inelastic; Esteves (2014b) extends the
literature on BBPD allowing rms to employ retention strategies as a way to avoid losing part of the old customers
willing to switch, and Esteves and Vasconcelos (2015) look at mergers when BBPD is permitted.
9Some authors have looked at competitive price discrimination when there is imperfect information on the
rmsside: under static price discrimination (e.g. Chen et al (2001), Liu and Serfes (2004) and Esteves (2014))
and under BBPD (Colombo (2016)).
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4 presents two benchmarks, the case where price discrimination is not allowed and the case where
price discrimination is permitted but consumers are fully informed consumers. The competitive
e¤ects of BBPD are discussed in Section 5. The welfare e¤ects of price discrimination are
addressed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and an appendix collects the proofs that were
omitted from the text.
2 The model
There are two periods, 1 and 2, and two rms, A and B, launching a new di¤erentiated non-
durable good, which is produced at a constant marginal cost, assumed to be zero without loss
of generality. The rms are located at the extremes of the unit interval, and consumers are
uniformly distributed along this interval. The location of a consumer  2 [0; 1] represents his
relative preference for rm B over A and remains xed for both periods of consumption. The
parameter t measures how much a consumer dislikes buying a less preferred brand. Although
consumers are endowed with preferences over products, it is assumed that they are initially
uninformed about the existence and the price of the goods. Like in Stahl (1994) a potential
consumer cannot be an actual buyer unless rms invest in informative advertising.10 The role of
advertising is to convey information about the product existence and its price. There is a large
number of consumers, with mass normalized to one, who desire to buy at most one unit of the
good in each period. Each consumer has a reservation value v for the product, which is assumed
to be large enough such that any informed consumer always buys one unit of the product.
The game proceeds as follows. In the rst-period, rms choose advertising intensities and
prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The advertising messages of each rm contain
truthful11 and complete information about the existence of its product and price. Firm i chooses
its advertising level, i; and its price, pi, i = A;B. Because the number of consumers is
normalized to unit, i 2 [0; 1] can be interpreted as the share of consumers who receive ads from
rm i: After rms have sent their ads independently, a proportion i and j of consumers is
reached, respectively, by rm i and j advertising campaign. Therefore, the potential demand
of rm i is made of a group of captive customers, namely i
 
1  j

; and a group of selective
10 Implicitly it is assumed that for new products search costs are prohibitively high.
11This is guaranteed by the FTC regulation that prohibits advertisers from making false and deceptive state-
ments about their products (see www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/ad-faqs.htm).
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customers, namely ij .
12 A selective consumer buys from the rm o¤ering him the highest
surplus. A captive consumer is willing to buy the product as long as he gets a non-negative
surplus.
Advertising has a long-run nature. In period 1, advertising creates awareness (and also
informs about prices). Because prices can change faster than consumersawareness, we assume
that in period 2 the level of awareness is constant and rms can only change prices.
In period 1 price discrimination is unfeasible because rms have no information about con-
sumerstypes. However, in a repeated interaction, by collecting information about the reach
of its advertising and about the informed customerspast behavior, a rm might be able to learn
whether a previous informed consumer is an actual buyer or rather a customer that bought from
a rival before. Note that as it is assumed that any informed consumer always buys, when say
rm i realizes that a specic consumer receives one of its ad and decides not to buy product i
in period 1, then it must be the case that this consumer also receive an ad from the rival which
means that it is a selective consumer with a preference for the rival. However, it is important
to stress that although each rm i has the ability identify the selective consumers who bought
from the rival in period 1, it cannot distinguish within the group of their own informed previous
consumers those who are captive and those who are selective with a preference for product i.
When a rm achieves this type of learning, in period 2 it may have incentives to entice
the group of selective consumers previously buying from the rival to switch, by o¤ering them
a better deal. As said, we assume that in the second period rms can identify and reach the
same consumers with no additional cost.13 Thus, being price discrimination permitted in period
2, the rms are constrained to reach the same consumers but they can choose di¤erent prices
to their own customers and to the rivals selective customers. Firm i selects a pair of second
period prices,

pOi ; p
R
i
	
, where pOi is rm is price targeted to its own customers and p
R
i is rm
12The remaining consumers, in proportion (1  i)(1  j); receive no ad from either rm, are uninformed and
excluded from the market.
13There are several examples where rms can identify consumers that received their initial ads. When rms
advertise their products through an advertising network they can have access to a retargeting technology through
which it is easy for them to communicate with those customers that received their ads in the rst period. Finally,
rms may identify consumers at subsequent moments because in a rst interaction they asked consumers to
register. In this case, their email may be one of the requirements allowing sellers to subsequently communicate
on a one-to-one basis.
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is price targeted to the group of selective consumers previously buying from the rival. We can
think of second-period prices being quoted via private and personalized o¤ers (e.g. retargeted
ads, e-mail, mobile sms, creation of targeted websites, and so on). Firms and consumers have
a common discount factor  2 [0; 1] : Each rm maximizes its discounted prots, and each
consumer maximizes his discounted utility.
Advertising technology Advertising is a costly activity for rms and conveys information
about product existence and price. The advertising technology is exogenously given and the same
for both rms. The cost of reaching a fraction  of consumers is given by the function A():
This function increases at an increasing rate, which formally can be written @A@ = A > 0 and
@2A
@2
= A > 0. The latter condition means that it is increasingly more expensive to inform an
additional customer or likewise, to reach a higher proportion of costumers. Additionally, there
are no xed costs in advertising, i.e., A (0) = 0. As the quadratic technology proposed in Tirole
(1988) has the advantage of being extremely simple to manipulate algebraically, whenever a
functional form is needed, we will assume that A() = a
2
2 : As in the present model there is a
large number of consumers, normalized to one, a can be identied with the cost per ad.14
3 Equilibrium analysis
As usual we solve the game working backward from the second period.
Second-period pricing Assume that rst period prices are

p1A; p
1
B
	
: Look rst at the
behavior of a captive consumer who is only aware of rm A. He buys from A as long as p1A+t  v
. Similarly, if the consumer is captive to rm B he buys from B as long as p1B + t (1  )  v:
Look next at the behavior of a selective consumer. At rst-period prices

p1A; p
1
B
	
there
is a cuto¤  2 [0; 1] such that a fully informed consumer located at  is indi¤erent between
buying from A and B. With no loss of generality consider the group of selective consumers who
bought from A in period 1, i.e., those located at [0; ] : Given the observed second period prices
pOA; p
R
B
	
some of them might be willing to switch. Specically, the indi¤erent consumer between
14Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) propose other technologies with the same mathematical
properties.
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buying again from A at price pOA and switch to B at price p
R
B is located at 
2
A such that
2A =
pRB   pOA + t
2t
: (1)
Consumers located at the left of 2A buy again from A, and those located at the right of 
2
A
switch to rm B. Regarding the group of selective consumers previously buying from B, those
located in the interval [; 1] ; the indi¤erent consumer between buying again from B at price pOB
and switch to A at price pRA is located at 
2
B, where
2B =
pOB   pRA + t
2t
: (2)
Therefore, given rm is second-period prices

pOi ; p
R
i
	
; its second-period prot is 2i =
Oi + 
R
i ; i = A;B; such that
OA = p
O
AA

(1  B) + B

pRB   pOA + t
2t

;
RA = p
R
AAB

pOB   pRA + t
2t
  

;
OB = p
O
BB

(1  A) + A

pRA   pOB + t
2t

;
RB = p
R
BAB

   p
R
B   pOA + t
2t

:
Firm i chooses pOi in order to maximize 
O
i and p
R
i in order to maximize 
R
i : The rst-order
conditions yield15
pOA =
t [4 + B (2
   3)]
3B
and pRA =
t [2 + A (1  4)]
3A
; (3)
pOB =
t [4  A (2 + 1)]
3A
and pRB =
t [2 + B (4
   3)]
3B
: (4)
Therefore, rm A and Bs second period prots are, respectively,
2A =
t
h
2A (4 + B (2
   3))2 + 2B (2 + A (1  4))2
i
18AB
; (5)
and
2B =
t
h
2B (4  A (2 + 1))2 + 2A (2 + B (4   3))2
i
18AB
: (6)
15 It is straightforward to see that the second-order conditions are also satised.
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First-period pricing and advertising decisions Consider next rst-period pricing and
advertising decisions. If rst-period prices lead to a cuto¤  the selective consumer located at
 is indi¤erent between buying from rm A in period 1 at price p1A and then buying from B in
period 2 at the poaching price pRB, or buying from B in period 1 at price p
1
B and then buying
from A at the poaching price pRA. At an interior solution we must observe:
v   p1A   t + 
 
v   pRB   t (1  )

= v   p1B   t (1  ) + 
 
v   pRA   t

: (7)
From equations (3) and (4) we obtain:
 =
t (2B   2A + AB) + 3AB
 
t  p1A + p1B

2tAB ( + 3)
: (8)
Now consider the equilibrium choices of p1A and p
1
B. At an interior solution, rm is overall
objective function is given by:
Max
pi;i
i = 
1
i + 
2
i :
where 2A is dened in (5) and
1A = p
1
AA [(1  B) + B] A (A) : (9)
As the game is symmetric we are looking for a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium
such that p1A = p
1
B = p
1, A = B = 
 and  = 12 .
Proposition 1. When price discrimination is permitted there is a SPNE in which:
(i) Each rm selects an advertising reach, denoted  2 [0; 1] ; implicitly dened by:
A (
) =
t (2  )2
2
  t (2  
)
6
: (10)
(ii) Each rm chooses rst and second period prices equal to
p1 = t

1 +

3

2  


; (11)
pO =
2t
3

2  


; (12)
pR =
t
3

2  


: (13)
(iii) First and second period prots are, respectively:
1 =
t
2
(2  )2

1 +

3

 A () ;
10
2 =
5
18
t (2  )2 : (14)
Thus, each rm overall prot is equal to
 =
t
18
(2  )2 (8 + 9) A () : (15)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 highlights that as in other models of BBPD rms charge lower prices to the
rivals previous customers than to their own customers. Additionally, it shows that consumers
face lower prices in the second-period than in the rst-period. This is the all-out competi-
tion result that tends to occur in markets exhibiting best-response asymmetry. Note also
that less advertising in period 1 has a positive e¤ect both on rst and second period prices
@pk
@ < 0; with k = 1; O;R

. Clearly, less advertising in period 1 increases the informational
di¤erentiation, reduces the elasticity of demand and allows rms to raise prices. When rms re-
duce their advertising reach they compete less aggressively in prices in both periods because less
consumers will be aware of both rms. This strategic reasoning will be important to understand
the impact of BBPD on the rmsadvertising choices in period 1.
Using equation (10) and the fact that for the quadratic technology A () = a it is
straightforward to prove corollary 1.
Corollary 1. When rms use the quadratic technology, i.e., when A() = a2
2 there is a
SPNE in which:
(i) Each rm selects an advertising reach equal to  = 2
1+ 
6
+
q
2
36
+ 2a
t
where 0 <  < 1 as
long as a > t
 
3 
6

:16
(ii) Each rm chooses rst and second period prices respectively equal to:
p1 =
( + 3)

t +
p
t22 + 72at

18
; (16)
pO =
t +
p
t22 + 72at
9
; (17)
pR =
t +
p
t22 + 72at
18
: (18)
16 It is important to stress that there is also a relation between a and v: Specically, given the equilibrium prices
and advertsing level we nust impose that consumer surplus is positive, thus given v there is a upward limit on a:
In a numerical example this implies that v should be high enough in relation to a:
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(iii) Overall equilibrium prot per rm are equal to:
 =
1
1 + 6 +
q
2
36 +
2a
t
2
264 t (8 + 9)
18
0@
3
+ 2
s
2
36
+
2a
t
1A2   2a
375
Note that when a  t  3 6  then  = 1; and the results under full information would be
obtained (see section 4.2).
4 Benchmarks
Before proceeding we present next two benchmark models. We rst consider the case where price
discrimination is not permitted in period 2. Then we consider the case where price discrimination
is permitted and consumers are perfectly informed about the rmsexistence (i.e.,  = 1). The
analysis in the latter case is based on Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
4.1 No discrimination
Consider that price discrimination is for any reason not permitted. In the rst-period, rms
choose advertising intensities and prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In the second
period, rms are forced to set the same prices. This means that, once prices are publicly an-
nounced through advertising in period 1, they must remain for the entire duration of the game.
I will use this benchmark case to evaluate the competitive and welfare e¤ects of price discrimi-
nation with advertising. Firm i prot is equal to:
i = (1 + ) pii
 
1  j

+ j

pj   pi + t
2t

 A (i)
Let the superscript nd identify the no-discrimination case. Following a similar approach as in
Tirole (1988) it is straightforward to obtain Proposition 2.17
Proposition 2. In the benchmark case without price discrimination there is a symmetric
SPNE in which:
17The results derived in Tirole (1988) are obtained for the special case of  = 0:
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(i) Each rm selects an advertising reach, denoted nd 2 [0; 1] ; implicitly dened by:
A

nd

=
t ( + 1)
 
2  nd2
2nd
: (19)
(ii) The price for the two periods of consumption is equal to
pnd =
t
 
2  nd
nd
: (20)
(iii) Each rms prot is
ndi =
t (1 + )
 
2  nd2
2
 A

nd

:
Proof. See the Appendix.
With no-discrimination industry prots are
ndind = (1 + ) t(2  nd)2   2A

nd

(21)
aggregate welfare is
Wnd = (1 + )

vnd

2  nd

  t
4

nd

4  3nd

  2A

nd

; (22)
and consumer surplus equals:
CSnd = (1 + )

vnd

2  nd

+
t
4

16 + nd

12  nd

: (23)
From equation (19) for the specic case of the quadratic technology it is straightforward to
obtain Corollary 2.18
Corollary 2. When the advertising technology is A() = a
2
2 there is a symmetric SPNE
in which:
(i) Each rm selects an advertising reach of
nd =
2
1 +
q
2a
t(1+)
(24)
18As expected when  = 0 we obtain the static results presented in Tirole (1988).
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with 0 < nd < 1 as long as a > t(+1)2 ;
19 and a price equal to
pnd =
r
2at
1 + 
: (25)
(ii) Each rms overall equilibrium prot equals
ndi =
2a
1 +
q
2a
t(1+)
2 : (26)
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.2 BBPD with perfectly informed consumers
Now we assume that consumers are fully informed about productsexistence and prices. The
analysis here is similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) with consumer preferences uniformly
distributed. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) it is straightforward to establish Proposition
3. Let the superscript f identify the case with full informed consumers.
Proposition 3. When price discrimination is permitted there is a symmetric SPNE in
which:
(i) First-period equilibrium prices are p1;f = t
 
1 + 3

.
(ii) Second-period equilibrium prices are pO;f = 23 t and p
R;f = 13 t:
(iii) Each rm overall prot equals
fi =
1
18
t (8 + 9) : (27)
Industry prot is
find =
1
9
t (8 + 9) ; (28)
overall welfare equals
W f = v (1 + )  1
4
t  11
36
t; (29)
and consumer surplus is given by
CSf = v (1 + )  5
4
t  43
36
t: (30)
19For the quadratic technology when a  t(+1)
2
then nd = 1:
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As expected, the prices in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) are a special case of those dened in
Proposition 1 when  = 1: Further, it is straightforward to see that the prices under BBPD with
full informed consumers are below their counterparts when consumers are imperfectly informed.
In other words, p1;f < p1; pO;f < pO and pR;f < pR:
5 Implications of price discrimination
This section investigates how the permission of price discrimination a¤ects the equilibrium
outcomes i.e., advertising intensity, prices and prots in markets where consumers are ini-
tially uninformed and rms need to invest in advertising to create awareness for their products.
Proposition 4. Regardless of the advertising technology considered:
(i) Firms advertise less under BBPD than under no-discrimination, i.e.,  < nd.
(ii) The following relationship between rst period, second period and non discrimination
prices holds: pR < pO < pnd < p1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 sheds light on the dynamic e¤ects of price discrimination on rmsadvertising
and price decisions. Part (i) shows that BBPD has a signicant e¤ect on rmsadvertising strate-
gies. Specically, it shows that the permission of BBPD leads rms to reduce their advertising
e¤orts.
The result of less advertising due to price discrimination should be compare to less/more
advertising in Esteves (2009a). Under the homogenous product approach, Esteves (2009a) shows
that depending on whether advertising costs are high or low, rms may advertise more or less
with discrimination, respectively. In this model only the high price rm in period 1 has in-
formation to price discriminate and so price discrimination raises the second-period prot of
the discriminating rm. When discrimination is permitted each rm has a dynamic incentive
to become the discriminating rm and to induce the non-discriminating rm to play less ag-
gressively in the subsequent period. While the former goal is achieved by pricing strategically
high in period 1, the latter goal is achieved by choosing a rst-period advertising intensity that
strategically increases the non-discriminating rms captive segment.
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By extending Esteves (2009a) to a product di¤erentiation framework we show that the
permission of price discrimination leads always to less advertising in period 1. In our framework
rst period equilibrium price is in pure strategies and both rms have information to engage in
price discrimination in the next period. Firms take into account that more advertising creates
a bigger common market which leads to more aggressive price behavior in period 2 due to the
best response asymmetry feature of the market. On the other hand, rms also take into account
that in period 2 they have no information to recognize in their base of own customers those who
are captive and those who are selective. The higher is the group of captive customers the higher
will be pO and so pR. This suggest that rms have a strategic incentive to reduce the rst-period
advertising intensity because by reducing the size of the group of fully informed consumers, they
induce a softer pricing behavior in period 2 and so doing they reduce the negative e¤ects of price
discrimination.
Hence, the paper highlights that in comparison to the no-discrimination case, the permission
of price discrimination leads rms to strategically reduce their advertising intensities in period
1 as an attempt to soften price competition in the subsequent period. This in turn also induces
rms to play less aggressively in period 1.
Next we discuss the implications of BBPD on the prices paid by di¤erent types of consumers
in both periods. As in other models of BBPD (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)), in comparison
to uniform pricing, under price discrimination consumers are overcharged in the rst period but
then strong competition leads to reduced prices in the second period. The reduction is more
pronounced for the rivals previous customers that need to be encouraged to buy their less
favorite good.
In comparison to the case where consumers are fully informed, consumers pay higher prices
in both periods under imperfect information; and prices will be higher as rms advertise less
intensively in period 1. Less advertising in period 1 increases the informational di¤erentiation,
reduces the elasticity of demand and allows rms to raise prices. Additionally, the fact that in
period 2 rms cannot distinguish a captive from a selective previous customer also contributes
to soften price competition in this period, allowing second-period discriminatory prices to be
above their full information counterparts.
Regarding rst-period prices, in comparison to Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), here there
is an additional e¤ect explaining why rst period price with BBPD is further above the non-
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discrimination counterpart. Like in Fudenberg and Tirole because consumers correctly anticipate
that they will be o¤ered lower second-period prices, rst period demand is less elastic allowing
rms to raise rst period prices. Additionally, the existence of imperfect awareness further
reduces the elasticity of demand and allows rms to further raise prices in the beginning of the
game. Indeed, note that at the symmetric equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole the elasticity of
demand is equal to:
"1 =  @D1
@p1A
p1
D1
=
p1
t
 

3 + 1
 (31)
while in the present model it equals:
"1 =  @D1
@p1A
p1
D1
=
p1
t
 

3 + 1

(2  ) : (32)
Thus the lower is the intensity of advertising, the lower is "1 and so the higher are the rst period
prices. (Obviously, when  = 1 expression (32) is equal to expression (31)). This explains why
pnd < p1;f < p1:
Proposition 5. Regardless the advertising technology considered behavior-based price dis-
crimination boosts the rmsoverall prot.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In comparison to uniform pricing, although price discrimination has a negative e¤ect on
second-period prots (through lower prices in period 2), it has a positive e¤ect on rst-period
prot (through higher prices in period 1). As the increase in rst period prot more than
compensates the decrease in second-period prot, there is a net positive e¤ect on overall prots.
The nding that BBPD can boost prots is a relevant contribution of this model and chal-
lenges the traditional view that rms are worse o¤ when engaging in behavior-based price dis-
crimination practices. In fact, a standard result in the literature on BBPD is that it is generally
the case that overall prots decrease when rms engage in price discriminate. In markets with
best-response asymmetry this tends to occur when (i) all rms have the required information
to engage in price discrimination, (ii) consumer preferences are xed across periods and (iii)
consumers are fully informed (e.g. Chen (1997), Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000), Esteves (2010)). An important contribution of the present model is to show that the
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use of BBPD in markets with informational di¤erentiation among consumers (due to the rms
advertising decisions) can act in favour of industry prots.
Since price and advertising decisions are a¤ected by the advertising cost, prots are also
a¤ected. We observe that the signal of the e¤ect of a on prots is the same with and without
price discrimination. Specically, we nd that prots increase as advertising becomes more
costly,
 
@
@a > 0

. This is a well-known result in the literature on informative advertising (e.g.
Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Stahl (1994)). In general, whilst an increase in advertising costs
has a negative direct e¤ecton prots, under competition there is also a strategic e¤ect, as
advertising costs increase, rms respond with less advertising, permitting prices to rise. When
the strategic e¤ect dominates, prots may increase with advertising costs. Higher advertising
costs lead to lower shares of informed consumers and so to a lower segment of selective customers.
Demand becomes less elastic and prices move upwards. When price discrimination is permitted,
the strategic e¤ect is stronger, rms respond with lower levels of advertising which translates
into higher prots.
If we depart from a situation where a is such that  is high (a is low), less advertising is
more likely to increase the fraction of captive customers (range of a where  < 0:5) than the
fraction of selective customers. In this case the probability of reaching an uninformed buyer is
high, rms have more incentives to focus on the group of captive consumers, they quote high
prices and prots increase.
It is interesting to note that when advertising costs are such that  > 0:5; the share of
selective consumers is higher than the share of each rms captive consumers. As advertising
costs increase the share of selective consumers is smaller allowing rms to compete less aggres-
sively under price discrimination. Because in period 2 rms are not able to distinguish in their
group of own customers the selective and captive consumers, they have less incentives to reduce
the price targeted to their own previous customers when they face a higher share of captive
consumers. As prices are strategic complements, when pOi moves upwards the same happens to
pRj : Therefore, higher advertising costs has the strategic e¤ect of increasing the group of captive
customers, thereby softening price competition under BBPD. Additionally, a higher share of
captive consumers also induces rms to adopt a softer behavior in period 1, which translates
into higher prices and prots.
The model predicts that rms are expected to benet the most from behavior-based price
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discrimination practices in industries characterized by high advertising costs. It can be said
that a high a acts as collusive device because it induces rms to reduce the their advertising
e¤orts and helps them sustaining higher prots. Additionally, the model predicts that restric-
tions on advertising and industry lobby in favour of these restrictions in contexts where price
discrimination is permitted would act in favour of prots at the expense of consumers.
Next we discuss the prot implications of BBPD in markets where consumers are fully in-
formed in comparison to the case where, for instance due to the rmsadvertising decisions,
consumers are imperfectly informed, in the sense that some are captive to one of the rms
while others are fully informed (switchers). As rst and second period prices with BBPD un-
der imperfect information are above their full information counterparts, prots under imperfect
information can be above the perfect information level. Using equations (15) and (27) it is
straightforward to see that  > f if t18 (2  )2 (8 + 9)   A () > t18 (8 + 9), which sim-
plies to
t (8 + 9)
18
h
(2  )2   1
i
> A () :
Note that the expression in brackets is positive and decreasing with : As @

@a < 0 then as a
increases,  decreases and it is more likely to nd that  > f : Thus, the positive e¤ect of
informational di¤erentiation on prots needs to be higher than the cost of advertising.
Figure 1 plots each rm prot when it employs BBPD in the case where consumers are fully
informed (Prot_Full Inf.) and in the case where rms need to invest in advertising to generate
awareness (Prot_Imp.Inf.). Prots are plotted as a function of the advertising cost a: In the
same gure, with a di¤erent interpretation of the vertical axis, we also plot the equilibrium level
of advertising  2 (0; 1) as a function of a: The gure is plotted for the quadratic advertising
technology, t = 1;  = 1 and for the range where  < 1 is dened, i.e., a > t
 
3 
6

:
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For the numerical example presented we nd that fi < 

i as long as a > 0:5816 (or,
 < 0:88575). This suggests that as long as advertising costs are not too low then  > f : In
this case when we depart from BBPD with full information to BBPD with imperfect information
we nd that the positive impact of higher prices on prots more than compensates the nega-
tive impact of advertising costs. Due to the strategic e¤ects of advertising, higher advertising
costs translate into less advertising, more market power and higher rmsprots. Thus, the
model predicts that in comparison to the benchmark case with fully informed consumers (e.g.
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)), behavior-based price discrimination can increase industry prots
as long as advertising costs are not too low.
Therefore, the prot results obtained highlight the importance of taking into account the
di¤erent forms of market competition when competition policy agencies try to evaluate the e¤ects
of price discrimination in competitive settings. This suggests that price discrimination strategies
should not be considered in isolation. There are interactions between price discrimination and
other marketing strategies such as the advertising decisions that need to be taken into account.
6 Welfare analysis
A recurrent policy question is whether to restrict price discrimination policies. This section
evaluates the impact of price discrimination on consumer and social welfare. To simplify the
analysis, throughout this section it is assumed that  = 1. Given the equilibrium solutions
20
derived in Proposition 1, it is straightforward to obtain that welfare in period 1 and 2, is
respectively given by
w1 = v
 (2  )  t
4
( (4  3))  2A () ;
w2 = 2
 (1  )

v   t
2

+ v2   t
36
 
112   8 + 8 :
Note that if  = nd overall welfare in period 1 would be equal to its no discrimination
counterpart. Thus, overall welfare equals
W  = 2v (2  ) + 1
9
t
 
132   16   2  2A () : (33)
As equilibrium industry prot is ind =
34t
18 (2  )2   2A (), consumer surplus equals:
CS = 2v   2
9
t
 
22   26 + 35 : (34)
Taking into account equation (23) we can establish the following result.
Proposition 6. In comparison to no discrimination, regardless of the advertising technol-
ogy considered, BBPD boosts industry prots and reduces consumer surplus.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 has important implications regarding the prot and consumer welfare e¤ects
of BBPD. In sharp contrast to the usual nding that price discrimination in competitive settings
can benet consumers at the expense of industry prots, our model predicts the reverse: price
discrimination based on purchase history benets industry prots and harms consumers.
Regarding overall welfare, although we cannot formally prove whether it is higher under
uniform pricing or under BBPD, Figure 2 plots aggregate welfare for the quadratic advertising
technology, t = 1;  = 1 and for the range where a is such that both  and nd are dened
which implies that a > t:We also take into account that v should be high enough in comparison
to a such that all consumers entering the market get a non-negative surplus.
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The numerical example presented shows that like in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) welfare
falls when rms engage in price discrimination based on purchase history. Here apart from the
negative impact of BBPD on welfare due to more ine¢ cient switching there is also the negative
impact of less advertising when rms employ BBPD which translates into a smaller share of
consumers entering the market. As aforementioned, the model highlights the importance of
investigating the welfare e¤ects of price discrimination in markets where consumersawareness
is determined by the rmsadvertising decisions, which in turn can be a¤ected by the possibility
of engaging in price discrimination practices.
While consumer surplus increases at the expense of industry prots when BBPD is permitted
and consumers are fully informed, the reverse happens in our framework. The model predicts
that advertising choices might help rms to introduce imperfect information into the market
which may act to soften price competition and boost prots when BBPD is permitted. In
contrast to the relation between industry prots and advertising costs, consumer surplus and
welfare are higher in markets with lower advertising costs (more advertising). From equation
(34) it is straightforward to see CS increases with  (@CS@ > 0).
Compare next our consumer surplus and welfare results with those under full informed
consumers. Using equations (30) and (34), it is straightforward to prove that CS < CSf :
As mentioned, although BBPD benets consumers under perfect information, the same does
not occur when consumers are imperfectly informed. In fact while BBPD under full information
boosts consumer surplus at the expense of industry prots, the reverse happens in our framework.
Figure 3 plots aggregate welfare for the quadratic advertising technology, t = 1;  = 1 and for
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the range where a is such that both  is dened which implies that a >
 
3 
6

: We also take
into account that v should be high enough in comparison to a such that all consumers entering
the market get a non-negative surplus. The numerical example shows that that overall welfare
falls when BBPD is employed under a lower share of informed consumers.
Advertising cost (a)
Welfare W_Full Inf.
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The numerical example presented shows that welfare falls when we depart from BBPD
with full informed consumers to the case where consumers are imperfectly informed due to the
rmsadvertising decisions. The reduction on welfare is expected to be stronger as advertising
costs increase because the share of informed consumers who can enter the market falls. Hence,
our model highlights that in comparison to the case of full informed consumers, BBPD under
imperfectly informed consumers can benet industry prots at the expense of consumer surplus
and overall welfare. This is likely to be the case in industries with high advertising costs.
7 Conclusions
The economics literature on oligopoly price discrimination by purchase history is relatively new
and has focused mostly on markets with perfectly informed consumers. With the exception
of Esteves (2009a) and De Nijs (2013) the possibility of rms using advertising as a way to
transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers has not been considered. The
present article di¤ers from the previous ones because we now consider duopoly competition with
horizontal di¤erentiation rather than duopoly competition with homogenous goods.
Our analysis challenges the traditional view that rms are worse o¤ and consumer can be
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better o¤when rms have information to engage in behavior-based price discrimination practices.
In comparison to no discrimination, we show that the impact of BBPD on prots and consumer
surplus is the reverse of the prot and consumer welfare results derived in models with full
informed consumers. In other words, we show that BBPD boosts industry prots and harms
consumers.
Additionally, we also show that the permission of BBPD leads rms to strategically reduce
their advertising e¤orts. Hence, the model predicts that rms are expected to benet the most
from behavior-based price discrimination practices in industries characterized by high advertising
costs. The model also predicts that restrictions on advertising and industry lobby in favour of
these restrictions in contexts where price discrimination is permitted would act in favour of
prots at the expense of consumers.
In light of the above, this paper has tried to contribute to the ongoing debate on the economic
implications of BBPD. For competition policy agencies, the prot and consumer results obtained
highlight the importance of taking into account the di¤erent forms of market competition when
evaluating the e¤ects of price discrimination in competitive settings. This suggests that price
discrimination strategies should not be considered in isolation. There are interactions between
price discrimination and other marketing strategies such as the rmsadvertising decisions that
need to be taken into account. It is obvious that the specicity of each market plays an important
role in the conclusions derived. A special limitation of the stylized model addressed in this paper
is the assumption that advertising is the consumerssole source of information. Although this
assumption may at rst sight seem odd in the context of online markets, it helped us to isolate
the e¤ects of price discrimination on the advertising decisions of rms. Evidently, while in new
product markets this assumption might not be very restrictive, in other markets it might be
inadequate. Allowing consumers to obtain information through advertising and costly search
could be a natural extension, bringing new insights to the analysis.20
20Nevertheless it is important to stress that as along as there is some proportion of captive consumers we expect
that our qualitative results should be obtained.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider rst the case of rm A. Its overall prot is equal to
A = 
1
A + 
2
A. As a remark notice that we are assuming the the rst period cuto¤ is equal to
 =
t (2B   2A + AB) + 3AB
 
t  p1A + p1B

2tAB ( + 3)
:
The derivative of overall prot with respect to p1A can be written as:
d1A
dp1A
+
d2A
d
d
dp1A
= 0
where
d1A
dp1A
=
3tA + tB   32 tAB   3ABpA + 32ABpB   12 tAB
t ( + 3)
d2A
d
=
8
9
tA  
8
9
tB  
10
9
tAB +
20
9
tAB
d
dp1A
=   3
6t+ 2t
:
From d
1
A
dpA
+
d2A
d
d
dpA
= 0 it follows that:
0 =
1
t ( + 3)

3tA + tB  
3
2
tAB   3ABpA +
3
2
ABpB  
1
2
tAB

  1
t ( + 3)2
(4tA   4tB   2tA + 2tB   5ABpA + 5ABpB)
and so, rm As best-response price function with respect to p1B is:
p1A =
(1 + ) t (10A + 2B) + tB (8  9A)  tAB( + 6) + ABp1B (3   1)
AB (8 + 6)
:
Looking now at the FOC with respect to A,
@A
@A
= 0 we have:
d1A
dA
+
d2A
d
d
dA
= 0:
Using the fact that
d1A
dA
=  pA
 
3B
 
t+ p1A   p1B
  6t+ tB
6t+ 2t
 AA ;
d
dA
=   
2A ( + 3)
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and
d2A
d
d
dA
=
2
32A ( + 3)
2
 
2t (2  ) (B   A) + 5AB
 
p1A   p1B

:
it is straightforward to nd rm As best-response with respect to j :
A (A) =
2
 
2t (A   B) (   2) + 5AB
 
p1A   p1B

32A ( + 3)
2  
p1A
  6t+ B  3t+ 3p1A   3p1B + t
2t ( + 3)
:
Symmetric expressions hold for rm Bs best-response functions. Since we are looking for a
symmetric equilibrium it must be the case that p1A = p
1
B = p
1 and A = B = 
. It follows
that
p1 = t(1 +

3
)

2  


and
A (
) =
p1 (6   (3 + ))
2 ( + 3)
therefore,
A (
) =
t (2  ) (6   (3 + ))
6
which simplies to
A (
) =
t (2  )2
2
  t (2  
)
6
(35)
Next prove (ii). Replacing  = 12and using the fact that 
 = A = B and taking that
pOA = p
O
B = p
O and pRA = p
R
B = p
R it is straightforward to nd that
pO =
2t
3

2  


and pR =
t
3

2  


:
Proof of Proposition 2: As rst period price decisions are valid for the two periods
assuming that each rm discounts future prots using a common discount factor,  2 (0; 1), rm
i prot is equal to:
i = (1 + )

pii
 
1  j

+ piij

pj   pi + t
2t

 A (i)
In period 1 rms simultaneously choose prices and advertising levels. Each rm goal is to solve
the following maximization problem:
max
pi;i

(1 + )

pii
 
1  j

+ piij

pj   pi + t
2t

 A (i)

:
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From the FOC we obtain:
pi =
1
2j
 
2t  tj + jpj

(36)
we obtain the FOC with respect to i :
pi (1 + )

1  j + j

pj   pi + t
2t

= A(i): (37)
Given the symmetry of the model, from equation (36) we obtain
pnd =
t
 
2  nd
nd
;
and the equilibrium level of advertising is implicitly dened by
(1 + ) t
 
2  nd2
2nd
= A(
nd);
Equilibrium prots are
nd = (1 + )
t
 
2  nd2
2
 A

nd

:
This completes the proof:
Proof of Proposition 4: Given the advertising equilibrium solutions with no discrimina-
tion and with BBPD, respectively equal to:
A

nd

=
t ( + 1)
 
2  nd2
2nd
(38)
A (
) =
t (2  )2
2
  t (2  
)
6
(39)
it follows that the right hand side of both expressions is decreasing in  and both would be equal
when  2 f2; 3g ; which is not possible given the domain of : Thus, it is straightforward to see
that for  2 [0; 1] the right-hand side of equation (38) is always higher than the right hand side
of equation (39). Since the left hand side of both expressions is the same, then it is always the
case that  < nd: This completes the proof of part (i), i.e., that nd > :21
21For the quadratic technology nd is dened as long as a  t , while  is dened when a 2 Rn 2t
3
	
: As long
as a  t is is always the case that nd > .
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Now we look at the behavior of the second period prices, when we move from no dis-
crimination to discrimination. Notice that from proposition 1 we have pO = 2t3

2 


and
pR = t3

2 


. From proposition 2 we have pnd = t

2 nd
nd

. From pO < pnd we obtain:
2t
3

2  


< t
 
2  nd
nd
!
We already know from part (i) that nd > . Thus it is always true
2t
3

2  


< t
 
2  nd
nd
!
< t

2  



2  


1
3
  1

< 0:
Since  2 ]0; 1] the previous expression is always negative. This proves that pO < pnd. Similarly,
we can prove that pR < pnd. We obtain that
t
3

2  


< t
 
2  nd
nd
!
< t

2  



2  


1
3
  1

< 0:
Since  2 ]0; 1] the previous expression is always negative. This completes the proof that pR <
pnd: Now we prove that p1 > pnd: Using the fact that p1 = t(1+ 3)

2 


and pnd1 = t

2 nd
nd

consider as an hypothesis that p1 < pnd. We have that
t(1 +

3
)

2  


< t
 
2  nd
nd
!
< t

2  



2  


(1 +

3
  1) < 0
2  



3
< 0:
Since  2 ]0; 1] and  > 0 then the previous inequality is always false. This it is always true
that p1 > pnd for any  2 ]0; 1].
Proof of Proposition 5: Each rm overall prot with and without discrimination is
respectively equal to:
 =
t
18
(2  )2 (8 + 9) A ()
nd =
t
2

2  nd
2
(1 + ) A

nd

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From  > nd it follows that:
A

nd

 A ()| {z }
(+)
>
t
2

2  nd
2
(1 + )  t
18
(2  )2 (8 + 9) :
Taking into account that nd > ; it is always true A
 
nd
   A () > 0: Therefore, if
t
2
 
2  nd2 (1 + )   t18 (2  )2 (8 + 9) < 0 the previous condition is always true. This
yields: 
2  n
2  
2
<
8 + 9
9 + 1
2  n
2   <
r
8 + 9
9 + 1
As nd >  it is always true that

2 n
2 

< 1: On the other hand, for 0 <  < 1; it is
straightforward to see that
q
8+9
9+1 > 1: Therefore,
2 n
2  <
q
8+9
9+1 is always true. This completes
the proof that  > nd:
Proof of Proposition 6: From
CS = 2v (2  ) + 2
9
t
  22 + 26   35
and
CSnd = 2vnd

2  nd

+
t
2

 nd2 + 12nd + 16

it follows that CS < CSnd :
2v (2  )| {z }
(1)
+
2
9
t
  22 + 26   35| {z }
(2)
<2vnd

2  nd

| {z }
(3)
+
t
2

 nd2 + 12nd + 16

| {z }
(4)
Note that  (2  ) is an increasing function of , 8 2 [0; 1] : Additionally as v > 0 and
nd > , then 2vnd
 
2  nd > 2v (2  ). Thus (3) > (1): Compare now (2) and (4):
Suppose that (2) < (4); this yields
2
9
t
  22 + 26   35 < t
2

 nd2 + 12nd + 16

It is straightforward to see that 8; nd 2 [0; 1] ; the left-hand side expression is always negative
while the right-hand side is always positive. Thus, it is always true that (2) < (4); implying
that (1) + (2) < (3) + (4). This completes the proof that CS < CSnd:
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